Bogusław Fiedor • Prof. Jan Zawadka, Joanna Pietrzak-Zawadka, The forest arborets and their activities for . mega system of economy, society and natural environment, and thereby cre- .. ekologicznych wzrostu (rozwoju) w Polsce oraz barier gospodarczych dla ochrony Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia”. System finansowy w Polsce, t. I i II. Bogusław Pietrzak, Zbigniew Polański, Barbara Woźniak (red.). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Foreign capital in the Polish banking system is an extremely important subject because of the topicality of the Supervisor, Bogusław Pietrzak (FASS / DESP).
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Therefore, our framework enables us to set guidelines on the way in which monetary policy should be conducted in the EMU accession countries. According to the Council, this principle applies to the new voting scheme since all members of the GC will have syatem voting right.
PKB Period random effects test equation: W latach student Historii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Three other studies are also worth noting: Table 11 presents the calculations of the symmetric S-S index under the assumption that all voters are home-biased. A GC member from a given pre-coalition will finanoswy enter into coalition with another member from this pre-coalition with a higher probability than with any member from outside that pre-coalition.
The S-S index relies on the assumption that the individual probability distributions over all voting outcomes are homogenous across decision-makers, whereas the B-z index assumes that those distributions are independent from each other. Various decision-making fknansowy are then applied to determine the outcome of the GC voting. First, we analyze which shocks are most important in creating uctuations of the Maastricht variables.
The Banzhaf index henceforth the B-z index is based on a notion of a swing. They measure the power of a voter as a priori probability that he will play a key role in a process of choosing from available alternatives. Ullrich and Belke and Styczynska consider the decision-making in the GC as an inter-temporal cooperative game.
Thus the S-S index totals all the theoretical situations in which a given voter can be a decisive one 23 and divides this sum by all possible voters permutations. The differences between the values of the S-S and B-z indices have, however, turned out to be negligible.
A similar study by Berger and Haan investigates the voting behavior of the decision-makers in the German Bundesbank. For instance, Belke and Styczynska show that the Board s power is only doubled when the one member, one vote principle is replaced with the rotation system.
Projekty badawcze Część IX – PDF
Moments of the Maastricht variables under the optimal monetary policy The optimal monetary policy violates two of the Maastricht convergence criteria, the CPI in ation criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion.
These distortions, however, remain significant. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. For example, too low an interest rate would lead to inflation pressure out of equilibrium and thus deteriorate the competitiveness of the domestic producers.
Ryzyko stopy procentowej
As far as labour supply elasticity 1 is concerned, the micro data estimates of consider [3; 20] as a reasonable range.
Moreover, in order to account for the heterogeneity of the currency union member states, for each of the 27 countries considered in the study the separate set of the above equations is constructed. Similarly to the previous research see section 2we confirm the finding that introduction of the rotation scheme strengthens considerably the voting power of the EB as compared to the xystem system Table The complete asset market assumption 2.
This extension is necessary to replicate properly the features of EMU macroeconomic adjustment and remain in line with the main logic of New-Keynesian open economy framework, as emphasized by Clarida et al. But as long as movements of the exchange rate are driven by structural shocks we approximate closely the original criterion. A number of studies investigate the possible impact of those regional biases on the monetary policy effectiveness. Notice that these constraints set the upper bounds on the variances of the Maastricht variables.
Fourthly, the new voting scheme is assessed as being highly intransparent. The next section introduces the model and derives the small open economy dynamics. Doktor nauk ekonomicznych Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona w Hiszpanii. C1 C33 Blanchard, O.
The results of our study show that if the latter argument turned out to be valid, it could badly influence the dystem of the ECB conduct. The value of Poland s Shapley-Shubik index under the old voting scheme would equal 3.